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COMMENT
ANTICOMPETITIVE DATA DISSEMINATION IN
THE MEDICAL PROFESSION: THE
CONFLICT BETWEEN THE
SHERMAN ACT AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT
The antitrust prohibitions of the Sherman Act' in many ways have
a "unique relationship ' 2 with the free speech guarantees of the first
amendment. 3 By protecting the free flow of information between buy-
ers and sellers,4 the Sherman Act protects first amendment rights to
disseminate and receive information. 5 By defining competition as the
goal of its prohibitions, 6 the Sherman Act, like the first amendment,
THE FOLLOWING CITATION WILL BE USED IN THIS COMMENT:
Havighurst, Professional Restraints on Innovation in Health Care Financing, 1978 DUKE L.J.
303, hereinafter cited as Havighurst.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976). Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: "Every contract, combi-
nation in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among
the several States,. . . is hereby declared to be illegal." Id. § 1. Interpreting the broad language
of the Sherman Act as congressional permission to establish a federal common law against trade
restraints, the Supreme Court has established, under section 1, prohibitions against a variety of
forms of anticompetitive agreements, including data dissemination, see, e.g., American Column &
Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921); and boycotts, see, e.g., Eastern States Retail
Lumber Dealers' Ass'n v. United States, 234 U.S. 600 (1914). See notes 20-59 infra and accompa-
nying text.
2. Martyn, LawyerAdvertising: The Unique Relationship Between First Amendment andAnti-
trust Protections, 23 WAYNE L. REv. 167, 167 (1976). For a general discussion of the proposition
that the Sherman Act complements the first amendment in protecting the free exchange of infor-
mation, see also Canby & Gelihorn, Physician Advertising: The First Amendment and the Sherman
Act, 1978 DUKE L.J. 543.
3. U.S. CONST. amend. I: "Congress shall make no law ... abridging the freedom of
speech .... "
4. "The courts that have considered the issue construe commercial advertising prohibitions
as unlawful restraints on trade under the Sherman Act." Martyn, supra note 2, at 173; see, e.g.,
United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961); Louisiana Petroleum
Retail Dealers v. Texas Co., 148 F. Supp. 334 (W.D. La. 1956).
5. See note 4 supra and note 8 infra.
6. The Supreme Court has maintained that the Sherman Act prohibition of "restraints of
trade," 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1976), should be interpreted as essentially prohibiting restrictions on com-
petition. See Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1910):
[W]hile the principles concerning contracts in restraint of trade, that is, voluntary re-
straint put by a person on his right to pursue his calling, hence only operating subjec-
tively, came generally [in the United States] to be recognized in accordance with the
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implicitly recognizes the importance of the free exchange of facts and
ideas.7 Indeed, both courts and federal agencies have turned to Sher-
man Act prohibitions to protect the freedom of speech.8
The Sherman Act and the first amendment do not, however, al-
ways act in conjunction to protect the free exchange of information. In
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States9 the Supreme Court
established that the Sherman Act may prohibit exchanges of informa-
tion among competitors when those exchanges lead to anticompetitive
behavior. Since American Column & Lumber the Court has developed
this Sherman Act prohibition, disallowing many anticompetitive infor-
mation exchanges. Despite the Court's general intolerance of such ex-
changes, one group of competitors-physicians-were for many years
protected from strict Sherman Act scrutiny and had significant freedom
to disseminate potentially anticompetitive information. This freedom
from strict antitrust review, known as the "learned professions exemp-
tion,"' 0 largely exempted anticompetitive practices of the learned pro-
fessions. In recent years the Court has eroded and arguably eliminated
this special exemption. It appears that physicians' dissemination of an-
ticompetitive data should now be subject to strict antitrust review."
The expansion of Sherman Act prohibitions to the dissemination
of anticompetitive data by physicians raises significant first amendment
concerns, because such communications are often inextricably tied to
important moral or ethical issues. Although the Sherman Act would,
in the absence of any special exemption, indiscriminately prohibit such
English rule, it came moreover to pass that contracts or acts which it was considered had
a monopolistic tendency, especially those which were thought to unduly diminish com-
petition and hence to enhance prices... came also in a generic sense to be spoken of
and treated as they had been in England, as restricting the due course of trade, and
therefore as being in restraint of trade.
7. An essential component of perfect competition is perfect information, which requires the
free exchange of facts and ideas. See R. LipsEy & P. STEINER, EcONOMics 269 (4th ed. 1975).
8. See United States v. Gasoline Retailers Ass'n, 285 F.2d 688 (7th Cir. 1961) (invalidating
under the Sherman Act an agreement between a union and gasoline station operators to refrain
from advertising). See also In re Amway Corp., 93 F.T.C. 618, 729 (1979) (appeal pending) (in-
validating under antitrust prohibitions a restraint on price advertising). The extent to which the
prohibitions of the Sherman Act are interchangeable with the free speech guarantees of the first
amendment was graphically demonstrated in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977). In Bates the
Supreme Court intimated that a restraint upon attorney advertising might violate the Sherman
Act. Because the restraint had been imposed by the Supreme Court of Arizona, however, the
Court held that it fell into the "state action" exemption of Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943),
which exempts state action from Sherman Act liability. 433 U.S. at 359-62. Undaunted, the Court
invalidated the restraint by relying on the first amendment. Id. at 363-84. See also Martyn, supra
note 2, at 173 n.30.
9. 257 U.S. 377 (1921). For a more detailed discussion of American Column & Lumber, see
notes 15-22 infra and accompanying text.
10. See notes 50-52 infra and accompanying text.
11. See notes 53-68 infra and accompanying text.
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communications whenever they violate the prohibition against an-
ticompetitive data dissemination, the Court's recent extension of first
amendment guarantees to commercial speech indicates that these com-
munications deserve substantial first amendment protection. The con-
current expansion of Sherman Act prohibitions to medical profession
communications and of first amendment protection to commercial
speech has thus created an uncomfortable tension between the Sher-
man Act and the first amendment.
This Comment discusses the early development of the antitrust
prohibitions of data dissemination, and the traditional means of recon-
ciling the tension between the Sherman Act and the first amendment.
Focusing on the medical profession, the Comment reviews the dissemi-
nation of anticompetitive data by physicians and the demise of the
learned professions exemption that once permitted them to engage
freely in anticompetitive activity. The Comment concludes that al-
though the erosion of the learned professions exemption suggests that
anticompetitive data dissemination by physicians should be subject to
strict Sherman Act review, the Court's analysis in the commercial
speech cases12 indicates that the first amendment protects such data dis-
semination. This conflict between the Sherman Act and the first
amendment may be resolved, however, by distinguishing between data
dissemination intended to coordinate anticompetitive conduct and data
dissemination intended to contribute to "the market place of ideas."' 3
By giving first amendment protection to the latter type of data dissemi-
nation and subjecting the former to strict antitrust review, the Sherman
Act could disallow manifestly anticompetitive schemes' 4 while intrud-
ing only minimally on first amendment guarantees.
I. ANTITRUST PROHIBITIONS OF DATA DISSEMINATION
American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States'5 was the first
Supreme Court case to hold that the Sherman Act prohibits anticompe-
titive data dissemination. The case concerned a trade association in the
hardwood industry that required its members to exchange information
about sales, prices, production, and other details of manufacturing and
12. See notes 87-108 infra and accompanying text.
13. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1980).
14. For a recent argument that even the regular exchange of price and production informa-
tion deserves first amendment protection, see Maginness, The Exchange ofPrice Information as a
Restraint ofTrade: Reassessing Per Se Rules in Light of First Amendment Protection ofCommercial
Speech, 48 FORDHAM L. REV. 1005 (1980).
15. 257 U.S. 377 (1921).
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merchandising.16 Despite the assertion by the association that the pur-
pose of the exchange was to "furnish information to enable each mem-
ber to intelligently make prices and to intelligently govern his
production,"1 7 the Court employed the "rule of reason'u s to examine
the actual purpose and the anticompetitive effect of the agreement.
The purpose and the effect, the Court found, were to keep "the supply
low and the prices high."'19 Over dissents by Justices Holmes 20 and
Brandeis, 2' the Court held that a trade association's exchange of infor-
mation could constitute "a combination and conspiracy in restraint of
interstate commerce" within section 1 of the Sherman Act.22 Such data
dissemination was therefore illegal. The Court never considered the
first amendment rights of the trade association.
16. Id. at 393-95. Compliance with the trade association's information exchange agreement
was not completely voluntary. Representatives of the association regularly reviewed and audited
the members' reports. Any member who failed to comply with the association's requirements was
not permitted to receive the reports of others. A member who failed to report for twelve days in
six months would be expelled from the association. -Id. at 395.
17. Id. at 392-93.
18. Under the Sherman Act there are two complementary tests for determining when a po-
tentially anticompetitive scheme is unlawful: the "rule of reason" and the "per se" rule. The
classic statement of the rule of reason, which requires an examination of the purpose and the effect
of a potentially anticompetitive scheme, was given by Justice Brandeis in Chicago Bd. of Trade v.
United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918):
The true test of legality is whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and
perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress or even
destroy competition. To determine that question the court must ordinarily consider the
facts peculiar to the business to which the restraint is applied; its condition before and
after the restraint was imposed; the nature of the restraint and its effect, actual or proba-
ble. The history of the restraint, the evil believed to exist, the reason for adopting the
particular remedy, the purpose or end sought to be attained, are all relevant facts. This is
not because a good intention will save an otherwise objectionable regulation or the re-
verse; but because knowledge of intent may help the court to interpret facts and to pre-
dict consequences.
Id. at 238.
In contrast, the per se rule requires no examination of effect; it applies to "agreements whose
nature and necessary effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry is
needed to establish their illegality-they are 'illegal per se.'" National Soc'y of Professional
Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
19. 257 U.S. at 404.
20. Id. at 412 (Holmes, J., dissenting). In his brief dissent, Justice Holmes observed that it
was "surprising in a country of free speech" that the Supreme Court would prohibit the dissemi-
nation of useful production information. Id. at 413. Rather than explicitly arguing that the first
amendment protected the information exchange, however, Justice Holmes supported his argument
simply by contending "that the Sherman Act did not set itself against knowledge." Id. at 412.
21. Id. at 413 (Brandeis, J., dissenting). Like Justice Holmes, Justice Brandeis suggested that
"there is nothing in the Sherman Law which should limit freedom of discussion, even among
traders." Id. at 416. Justice Brandeis likewise did not explicitly discuss the first amendment, but
defended the trade association's scheme because it tended "to promote all in competition which is
desirable." Id. at 418.
22. Id. at 412.
1145
1146 DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 1980:1142
Having prohibited the data dissemination in American Column &
Lumber, the Court subsequently disallowed numerous commercial in-
formation exchanges. In United States v. American Linseed Oil Co.23
the Court held that the daily reporting of the "intimate details" of
prices and sales by manufacturers and distributors of linseed oil vio-
lated the Sherman Act.2 4 Similarly, in Sugar Institute v. United States2s
the Court disallowed an agreement among competing sugar refiners to
exchange information concerning "prices, terms, and conditions. '26
Probably the most far-reaching of the Court's prohibitions of data dis-
semination was the 1969 case of United States v. Container Corp. of
America.2 7 In Container Corp. competing sellers of corrugated contain-
ers informally and irregularly exchanged information about the most
recent prices charged or quoted to specific customers. Sellers lowered
their prices to meet the prices of their .competitors, with the overall ef-
fect of stabilizing prices, "though at a downward level."128 Despite the
lack of convincing evidence demonstrating an unlawful purpose or an-
ticompetitive effect,29 the Court found that the inferences were "ir-
23. 262 U.S. 371 (1923). American Linseed Oil involved an agreement among manufacturers
and distributors to "mail by special delivery to the [information exchange] bureau a complete
report of its carload sales," including "quantity and kind, price, and terms," at the "close of each
day's business." Id. at 383. The purpose of the agreement, the Court found, was to substitute
"intelligent competition" for the free market competition previously existing in the industry. The
Court granted an injunction against the information exchange. Id. at 388-90.
24. Id. at 390.
25. 297 U.S. 553 (1936).
26. Id. at 577. Before Sugar Institute, in Maple Flooring Mfrs. Ass'n v. United States, 268
U.S. 563 (1925), the Court had seemed ready to retreat from the broad condemnations of American
Column & Lumber and American Linseed Oil. In Maple Flooring a trade association of flooring
manufacturers exchanged information concerning manufacturing costs, freight rates, sales vol-
ume, and prices. The association also held meetings at which corporate representatives would
"discuss the industry and exchange views as to its problems." Id. at 566-67. The Court did not
disallow the association's activities, finding that the record was "barren of evidence" indicating the
defendants' purpose was to discourage production or competition, or to otherwise restrain com-
merce. Id. at 577. American Column & Lumber and American Linseed Oil were distinguished on
the grounds that the "peculiar circumstances" of each case had led to the conclusion that competi-
tion had been restrained. Id. at 584-85.
The Court's decision in Maple Flooring is open to criticism. The exchanges of information
about manufacturing costs and freight rates did suggest an unlawful purpose by the members of
the trade association. L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ANTITRUST 269 (1977). Regard-
less of the correctness of the holding, however, subsequent cases have demonstrated that Maple
Flooring did not mark the beginning of a retreat from strict judicial scrutiny of commercial data
dissemination. Indeed, the current vitality of the Maple Flooring holding is questionable in light
of the more recent data dissemination cases. See notes 27-38 infra and accompanying text.
27. 393 U.S. 333 (1969).
28. Id. at 336.
29. See id. at 344 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Marshall's dissent highlighted the ab-
sence of any convincing evidence demonstrating an unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect,
arguing that neither the anticompetitive purpose nor the anticompetitive effect necessary to estab-
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resistable that the exchange of price information [had] an
anticompetitive effect in the industry." 30 Noting that interference with
the selling price of a commodity is unlawful per se,3 ' the Court con-
cluded that the information exchange violated the Sherman Act.32 As
in American Column & Lumber, the Court did not discuss first amend-
ment considerations.
Container Corp. has been correctly described as a confusing deci-
sion.33 The Court's willingness to declare an exchange of information
unlawful in the virtual absence of any evidence of wrongful purpose or
anticompetitive effect raised serious questions whether any exchange of
price information is permissible.3 4 The Court's reference in the opinion
to the per se rule further confused practitioners and legal scholars con-
cerning whether price exchange agreements were unlawful per se or
unlawful only under the purpose-and-effect analysis of the rule of rea-
son.3 5 To some extent, the confusion surrounding Container Corp. was
lish a Sherman Act violation had been demonstrated. Discussing the Government's failure to
demonstrate an anticompetitive effect, Justice Marshall referred to the district court's finding "that
the corrugated container market was highly competitive and that each defendant engaged in ac-
tive price competition." Id. at 345. Justice Marshall did not find the container market "suffi-
ciently oligopolistic" to justify the inference that an anticompetitive effect necessarily followed
from an information exchange. Id. at 343. Turning to whether the defendants manifested an
unlawful purpose, Justice Marshall emphasized that "[t]he Court does not hold that the agreement
in the present case was a deliberate attempt to stabilize prices. The evidence in the case, largely
the result of stipulation, would not support such a holding." Id. at 344. In the absence of evi-
dence demonstrating an unlawful purpose or anticompetitive effect, Justice Marshall concluded
that the information exchange did not violate the Sherman Act. Id. at 347. See generally Note,
Antitrust Implications of the Exchange of Price Information Among Competitors: The Container
Corporation Case, 68 MICH. L. REV. 720, 729-30 (1970).
30. 393 U.S. at. 337.
31. See note 18 supra.
32. 393 U.S. at 338.
33. See generally Kefauver, The Legality of Dissemination of Market Data by Trade Associa-
tions: What Does Container Hold?, 57 CORNELL L. REV. 777 (1972); Monroe, PracticalAntitrust
Considerationsfor Trade Associations, 1969 UTAH L. REV. 622, 626 n.24; Comment, The Creation
of a Separate Rule of Reason: Antitrust Liability for the Exchange of Price Information Among
Competitors, 1979 DUKE L.J. 1004, 1013-15; Note, supra note 29, at 730-3 1; Note, Antitrust Liabil-
ityfor an Exchange of Price Information-What Happened to Container Corporation?, 63 VA. L.
REV. 639 (1977); Note, Guidelines for Data Dissemination Through Trade Associations, 10 WASH-
BURN L.J. 93, 101-02 (1970).
34. See L. SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 272: "[Container Corp.] leaves the law in doubt. If
one projects from this case alone, then except for the most flagrantly competitive market showing
no indications of concentration, it is hard to picture a market where an attorney would confidently
predict that an exchange of price information is valid."
35. In a concurring opinion, Justice Fortas argued that the Court had not held that exchanges
of price information were illegal per se. In his view, "the probability that the exchange of specific
price information led to an unlawful effect upon prices" was "adequately buttressed by evidence
in the record." 393 U.S. at 339 (Fortas, J., concurring). Justice Fortas's conclusion was precisely
the opposite of that reached by Justice Marshall. Id. at 345 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See note 29
supra.
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resolved in United States v. United Gypsum Co.,36 in which the Court
explicitly endorsed the rule of reason while reversing the criminal con-
victions of gypsum board manufacturers for exchanging price informa-
tion.37 Nevertheless, Container Corp. indicates the Court's intolerance
of anticompetitive exchanges of commercial information.38 Container
Corp. also illustrates that even in the Court's most sweeping prohibi-
tions of commercial data dissemination, it has generally neglected the
free speech guarantees of the first amendment.
II. THE EXPANSION .OF ANTITRUST PROHIBITIONS: THE SHERMAN
ACT AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
Like the trade association in American Column & Lumber and the
competing sellers in Container Corp., medical societies and less for-
mally arranged groups of practicing physicians also disseminate vari-
ous proposals, resolutions, and opinions on a variety of professional
concerns. These intraprofessional communications-which may be
termed "professional speech" 39-- can take a variety of forms and in
some cases may greatly inhibit competition in the health care indus-
try.40 For example, a medical society might circulate a proposal or
opinion condemning a health insurer's adoption of a particular cost-
containment practice. This circulation of the society's professional
opinion, by educating members as to what best suits their economic
36. 438 U.S. 422 (1978). In United Gypsum members of the gypsum-board industry, includ-
ing the four largest producers, exchanged price information by telephone. Despite the members'
claim that the information exchange was necessary to comply with the Robinson-Patman Act, 15
U.S.C. § 13(b) (1976), which allows a seller to engage in price discrimination in order to meet the
price of a competitor, the Supreme Court held that the price information exchange should be
"subject to close scrutiny under the Sherman Act." 438 U.S. at 459. For a detailed discussion of
the significance of United Gypsum, see Comment, supra note 33, at 1037-39.
37. 438 U.S. at 441. But see Comment, supra note 33, at 1035-37 (arguing that the Gypsum
Court "in effect applied a per se test to price information exchanges," id. 1037). Although United
Gypsum is distinguishable from Container Corp. on the ground that United Gypsum involved a
criminal trial, the Supreme Court clearly indicated that the rule of reason was the proper test to be
applied in all data dissemination cases, thus resolving some of the confusion resulting from
Container Corp. The Court, in reaching this conclusion, cited Justice Fortas's concurring opinion
in Container Corp. 438 U.S. at 441 n.16. See note 35 supra.
38. Although the principal cases prohibiting data dissemination under the Sherman Act have
concerned the exchange of price information, the exchange of other marketing information having
an anticompetitive effect can be prohibited as well. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v.
United States, 257 U.S. 377 (1921). "In general, the analytic approaches [employed in evaluating
price circulation] are appropriate in evaluating circulation of non-price information ...... L.
SULLIVAN, supra note 26, at 274.
39. Purdue, The First Amendment Status of Professional Speech (April 17, 1978) (unpub-
lished memorandum in the Duke University School of Law Library).
40. For a detailed discussion of physicians' restraints on competition in the health care indus-
try through anticompetitive data dissemination and other means, see Havighurst.
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self-interests, may lead individual physicians to refuse to deal with that
insurer and thereby compromise cost-containment innovations in the
health care industry.41 Or, more simply, physicians may adopt, circu-
late, and adhere to an advisory fee schedule even though the medical
society does not enforce it.
There are many examples of the dissemination of anticompetitive
data by the medical profession. In Michigan a state medical society
sent mailgrams to society members criticizing an innovative health in-
surance program and claiming that under the program physicians were
"being asked to subsidize Blue Shield's cost containment efforts." 42
Similarly, the American Medical Association recently undertook a de-
tailed study of a new prepaid health care plan and issued a report criti-
cal of the plan.43 In Indiana a cost-containment effort aroused the
opposition of the Indiana State Medical Association, which formally
adopted a resolution critical of the plan.44
Despite the anticompetitive nature of much of this professional
speech, and despite the Supreme Court's manifest intolerance of an-
ticompetitive data dissemination, the Court had been hesitant to sub-
ject professional speech to the data dissemination prohibitions of
American Column & Lumber and Container Corp. This hesitation has
apparently resulted from the continued viability of the "learned profes-
sions exemption," which permitted the learned professions to engage in
various types of anticompetitive activity while remaining generally iso-
lated from Sherman Act liability.4 The Supreme Court's erosion and
41. Id. 354.
42. New Blue Shield Policies Stir Protests from" Michigan MDs, Am. Med. News, Sept. 19,
1977, at I, col. 2. In addition to circulating mailgrams critical of the innovative insurance pro-
gram, the medical society called an emergency session of the society's House of Delegates "to
consider the new actions." Id. col. 4.
43. See HMO Study Assexses Cost, Quality, Access to Care, Am. Med. News, Aug. 5, 1980, at
14, col. I. Of the many concerns currently facing the medical profession, the use of HMOs-
health maintenance organizations-has probably led to the most extensive dissemination of an-
ticompetitive data. See, e.g., HMO Subsidies Come Under Fire, Am. Med. News, Aug. 5, 1980, at
1, col. I. See generally Kissam, Health Maintenance Organizations and the Role ofAntitrust Law,
1978 DuKE L.J. 487.
44. Indiana MDs Hit Blue ShieldBenefit Plans, Am. Med. News, Nov. 14, 1977, at 19, col. 4.
Although there is some evidence that medical societies are now attempting to temper their an-
ticompetitive data dissemination, see New Ethical Principlesfor Nation's Physicians Voted byAMA
House, Am. Med. News, Aug. 5, 1980, at 1, col. 3, "other evidence suggests that medical organiza-
tions are still using their power to shape the economic environment in which physicians operate."
Havighurst 316. See, e.g., HMO Subsidies Come Under Fire, supra note 43. Until recently the
slogan "An Informed Membership Is Our Greatest Strength" appeared on the masthead of Amei-
can Medical News. See, e.g., Am. Med. News, Aug. 29, 1977, at 1.
45. Although the cases do not specify precisely which professions are "learned professions,"
they do indicate that this category includes at least accountants, architects, attorneys, clergymen,
dentists, doctors, engineers, opticians, optometrists, pharmacists, and veterinarians. J. VON KALI-
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arguable elimination of this special exemption now appears, however,
to expose the learned professions to strict Sherman Act review.
The demise of the learned professions exemption is troublesome
because of the moral, ethical,46 or simply occupational problems that
are the topic of professional speech. Subjecting this speech to strict
Sherman Act review would require that the speech be prohibited when-
ever it is motivated by anticompetitive intent, or has an anticompetitive
effect. 47 The expansion of first amendment guarantees to commercial
speech,48 however, suggests that physicians' professional speech
deserves first amendment protection.49 The tension between the free
speech guarantees of the first amendment and the data dissemination
prohibitions of the Sherman Act promises to ripen into a direct con-
frontation.
A. The Erosion of the Learned Professions Exemption.
The notion that the learned professions are exempt from Sherman
Act scrutiny apparently originated with a simple assertion by Justice
Holmes, in dictum, that "a firm of lawyers sending out a member to
argue a case. . . does not engage in such commerce" as would trigger
Sherman Act scrutiny.50 Despite this inauspicious beginning the ex-
emption prospered, making courts hesitate to impose Sherman Act
sanctions on the learned professions. In United States v. Oregon State
Medical Society,5' for example, the Supreme Court, holding that a
NOWSKI, ANTITRUST LAWS AND TRADE REGULATION § 49.01[l] n.1 (1979). Of these professions,
doctors have engaged most frequently in anticompetitive practices. See generally Havighurst.
46. See, e.g., C. Koop, THE RIGHT TO LIVE; THE RIGHT TO DIE (1979). In his book, which is
apparently directed to the general public as well as to fellow physicians, Dr. Koop discusses sev-
eral "emotional issues" currently facing the medical profession on moral and ethical grounds.
Arguing against abortion, for example, Dr. Koop emphasizes the "essential horror of such acts,"
and he suggests that in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973),
the Supreme Court embraced "the moral views of paganism." C. Koop, supra, at 39, 58. Dr.
Koop is not hesitant to criticize fellow physicians for what he considers their failure to weigh
moral concerns. In response to Chief Justice Burger's assertion in Roe that "the vast majority of
physicians... act only on the basis of carefully deliberated medical judgments relating to life
and health," 410 U.S. at 208 (Burger, C.J., concurring), Dr. Koop remarks, "the Chief Justice does
not know physicians as well as I do." C. Koop, supra, at 40-41. Like the trade association that
circulated commercial information in American Column & Lumber, see notes 15-22 supra and
accompanying text, Dr. Koop, besides publishing his views, disseminated them through "discus-
sions with medical students, interns, and residents" and in "seminars on personal ethics." C.
Koop, supra, at 13.
47. See note 18 supra.
48. See notes 76-108 infra and accompanying text.
49. See notes 109-30 infra and accompanying text.
50. Federal Baseball Club v. National League, 259 U.S. 200, 209 (1922). See Martyn, supra
note 2, at 183 n.89.
51. 343 U.S. 326 (1952).
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medical society had not violated the Sherman Act, stated:
[T]here are ethical considerations where the historic direct relation-
ship between patient and physician is involved which are quite dif-
ferent than the usual considerations prevailing in ordinary
commercial matters. This Court has recognized that forms of compe-
tition usual in the business world may be demoralizing to the ethical
standards of a profession.52
Although for many years the Supreme Court seemed willing to
recognize that the learned professions were "quite different ' 53 from
other groups of competitors, the Court significantly compromised the
learned professions exemption in the landmark case of Goldfarb v. Vir-
ginia State Bar.5 4 Goldfarb involved a minimum fee schedule for law-
yers that the Fairfax County Bar Association published and the
Virginia State Bar enforced. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Cir-
cuit held, in light of the learned professions exemption, that the Vir-
ginia State Bar was not subject to antitrust scrutiny,55 but the Supreme
Court reversed. Stating that "[t]he nature of an occupation, standing
alone, does not provide sanctuary from the Sherman Act, ' 56 the Court
held that the lawyers' price-fixing was illegal.5 7
Goldfarb limited, but did not eliminate, the learned professions ex-
emption. In a footnote, the Goldfarb Court suggested that it "would be
unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable with
other business activities. s58 The Court declined to discuss further the
special treatment accorded the learned professions under the antitrust
laws, but after Goldfarb the learned professions continued to enjoy iso-
lation from strict Sherman Act scrutiny.59
52. Id. at 336. For a detailed critical analysis of the Oregon State opinion, see Goldberg &
Greenberg, The Effect of Physician-Controlled Health Insurance. U.S. v. Oregon State Medical
Society, 2 J. HEALTH POL., Por'y & L. 48 (1977).
53. 343 U.S. at 336.
54. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
55. Goldfarb v. Virginia State Bar, 497 F.2d 1, 13-15, 20 (4th Cir. 1974), rev'd, 421 U.S. 773
(1975).
56. 421 U.S. at 787.
57. Id. at 792-93.
58. Id. at 788 n.17. The Court did not specify the degree to which the learned professions
remained exempt. The Court merely stated:
The fact that a restraint operates upon a profession as distinguished from a business
is, of course, relevant in determining whether that particular restraint violates the Sher-
man Act. It would be unrealistic to view the practice of professions as interchangeable
with other business activities, and automatically to apply to the professions antitrust con-
cepts which originated in other areas. The public service aspect, and other features of
the professions, may require that a particular practice, which could properly be viewed
as a violation of the Sherman Act in another context, be treated differently. We intimate
no view on any other situation than the one with which we are confronted today.
Id.
59. Boddicker v. American State Dental Ass'n, 549 F.2d 626 (9th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 825 (1978), probably best reveals the special antitrust review accorded the learned professions
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B. National Society of Professional Engineers v. United States.
Despite the Goldfarb Court's apparent willingness to recognize the
continued validity of the learned professions exemption, the most re-
cent Supreme Court case to raise the issue has significantly limited, if
not eliminated, the exemption. National Society of Professional Engi-
neers v. United States6° dealt with a professional engineering society's
canon of ethics that prohibited the society's members from submitting
competitive bids for engineering services. If a client insisted on receiv-
ing a competitive bid, the canon required the engineer to withdraw
from the proposed job.61 The society argued that the ethical restraint
should be upheld against a Sherman Act challenge because its goal was
to serve the public. Competitive bidding, the society maintained,
both before and after Goldfarb. In Boddicker a group of dentists claimed that a state dental asso-
ciation had violated the Sherman Act by requiring membership in the national dental association
as a condition of membership. Failure to retain membership in the national dental association
resulted in expulsion from the local organization and the loss of the "substantial benefits" of
membership, including group insurance, participation in education programs, and the referral of
patients by other members. 549 F.2d at 628. The plaintiffargued that the national dental associa-
tion, unlike the local association, offered no significant benefits. Id. at 628-29. Although under
other circumstances the membership requirement would probably have been declared a per se
violation of the Sherman Act, see United States v. Loew's, Inc., 371 U.S. 38 (1962); Northern Pac.
Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392
(1947), the court of appeals held that the dental association would escape liability if it could prove
that the purpose of the requirement was not to restrain trade, but to "serve the public." 549 F.2d
at 632. The court concluded that permitting a learned profession to survive a Sherman Act chal-
lenge if its action contributed "directly to improving service to the public" allowed "a harmoniza-
tion of the ends that both the professions and the Sherman Act serve." Id.
The rationale of Boddicker suggests that the Sherman Act does not always prohibit the
learned professions as guardians of public welfare from establishing rules to assure "a high order
of professional excellence." Id. at 628. The anticompetitiveness of the rules therefore had to be
balanced agaifist the benefits that accrued to the public. Id. at 632. By employing such a balanc-
ing test, the Boddicker court not only substituted the rule of reason for the per se rule, but also
departed from the principle that competition is the goal of the Sherman Act. See United States v.
Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388 U.S. 350 (1967); Timkin
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). But see Appalachian Coals, Inc. v.
United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court denied certiorari. 434 U.S.
825 (1978).
60. 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
61. The somewhat complex ethical rules of the engineering society essentially prevented any
competition from interfering with the rates charged by individual engineers. The sections in issue
provided:
The Engineer will not compete unfairly with another engineer by attempting to obtain
employment or advancement of professional engagements by competitive bidding. ...
c. He shall not solicit or submit engineering proposals on the basis of competitive
bidding. Competitive bidding for professional engineering services is defined as the for-
mal or informal submission, or receipt, ofverbal or written estimates or cost or proposals
in terms of dollars.. . or any other measure of compensation whereby the prospective
client may compare engineering services on a price basis prior to the time that one engi-
neer. . . has been selected for negotiations.
Id. at 683 n.3.
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would lead to deceptively low bids and thereby tempt engineers to do
inferior work "with consequent risk to public safety and health. 62
The Supreme Court rejected the society's argument. Because Con-
gress had decided by enacting the Sherman Act that competition would
best serve the public, 63 the society could not impose its views of "the
costs and benefits of competition on the entire marketplace." 64 The
Court's analysis strictly conformed to traditional Sherman Act analysis,
which has consistently defined competition as the Act's goal and has
recognized that restraints on competition are therefore unlawful. 65 The
Court noted the footnote in Goldfarb that had suggested that profes-
sional services differed from other business services, 66 but maintained
that the footnote meant that ethical rules of a professional society could
serve only to "regulate and promote. . . competition," not to inhibit
it.67 By suggesting that ethical rules may only regulate and promote
competition, the Court all but eliminated the learned professions ex-
emption. Any trade agreement that promotes competition is lawful
under the Sherman Act. Requiring the learned professions to conform
to this standard merely subjects them to traditional Sherman Act re-
view.68
Professional Engineers is significant also because it constitutes the
first explicit skirmish in the Supreme Court between the Sherman Act
and the free speech rights of professionals. The district court's order to
remedy the society's unlawful restraint of trade had prohibited the soci-
ety from "adopting any official opinion, policy statement, or guideline
stating or implying" that competitive bidding was unethical.69 This or-
der, the society contended, abridged its first amendment rights. The
Court rejected this contention.70 Significantly, however, the Court did
62. Id. at 693.
63. Id. at 694-95.
64. Id.
65. See United States v. Topco Assocs., 405 U.S. 596 (1972); United States v. Sealy, Inc., 388
U.S. 350 (1967); Timkin Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). But see Appa-
lachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933).
66. See note 58 supra.
67. 435 U.S. at 696.
68. Because the trade restriction imposed by the Society of Professional Engineers dealt with
price, the Court might not impose the rigorous holding of Professional Engineers on other an-
ticompetitive agreements by professional societies. The Court has usually been more anxious to
prohibit price restraints than other restraints on competition. See, eg., United States v. Socony-
Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Although nothing in the Professional Engineers opinion
suggests that a different standard should apply to nonprice restraints, some courts have continued
to recognize a limited exemption for professional trade restraints that do not deal with price. See,
e.g., Bogus v. American Speech & Hearing Ass'n, 582 F.2d 277, 291 n.18 (3d Cir. 1978).
69. 435 U.S. at 697.
70. Id.
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not decide that the society enjoyed no first amendment protection; in-
stead, the Court stated that the district court, having found the society
guilty of a Sherman Act violation, was empowered to fashion appropri-
ate restraints even though those restraints might curtail liberties that
the society "might otherwise enjoy. ' 71 While alluding to a potential
conflict between the Sherman Act and the first amendment, the Court
in Professional Engineers avoided that conflict by restricting the soci-
ety's freedom of speech "under the cloak of remedial judicial action. '72
The Court left unresolved the doctrinal conflict between the first
amendment and the Sherman Act.
III. THE EXPANSION OF FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES: THE
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND THE MEDICAL PROFESSION
With the demise of the learned professions exemption, physicians
can expect to be subject to increasingly strict Sherman Act review. In-
deed, several commentators have suggested that the data dissemination
prohibitions of American Column & Lumber and Container Corp.
should apply to physicians' professional speech.73 And the Supreme
Court in Goldfarb intimated in dictum that these data dissemination
prohibitions may apply to the learned professions.74 It appears inevita-
ble, then, that the freedom to communicate once accorded physicians
71. Id.
72. 435 U.S. at 701 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). Although Chief Justice Burger was apparently
not prepared to undertake a detailed defense of the engineers' first amendment rights, he did
register his disapproval with the Court's conclusion. He stated: "The First Amendment guaran-
tees the right to express [standards of ethics] and that right cannot be impaired under the cloak of
remedial judicial action." Id.
73. See, e.g., Havighurst 358-59. Discussing the increasing level of Sherman Act scrutiny of
physicians, Professor Havighurst suggests:
In [American Column & Lumber] the Supreme Court found unlawful an exchange of
information and opinion where such information and opinion was employed to knit a
multitude of competitors into a conspiracy. The somewhat comparable activities of pro-
fessional organizations should be subject to similar scrutiny, and, if a profession's pro-
pensity for concerted action appears particularly great, a commensurately strict
limitation on intraprofessional communications would be justified.
Id. See also Kissam, supra note 43, at 511; Comment, supra note 33, at 1019:
Recent decisions of the Supreme Court have looked behind the protective veil of the
learned professions exemption and have imposed Sherman Act liability upon profes-
sional organizations. This trend would seem to indicate that price information ex-
changes involving professional associations should be analyzed under the extended rule
of reason employed in Container Corp.
74. The Goldfarb Court, addressing "a naked agreement" to fix attorneys' fees, 421 U.S. at
782, indicated in dictum that even if the attorneys had merely disseminated pertinent fee informa-
tion they would have been subject to the American Column & Lumber data dissemination prohibi-
tion. Distinguishing an agreement to fix prices from the mere dissemination of price information,
the Court stated, "A purely advisory fee schedule issued to provide guidelines, or an exchange of
price information without a showing of an actual restraint on trade, would present us with a
different question, e.g., American Column Co. v. United States .... " 421 U.S. at 781. See also
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will not be permitted to continue.75
The doctrinal conflict between the first amendment and the Sher-
man Act has not resulted exclusively from the demise of the learned
professions exemption, however. In recent years the Supreme Court
has extended first amendment protection to commercial speech.76 Al-
though the professional speech of physicians does not involve the ad-
vertisement of goods or services, and therefore may not qualify as
commercial speech as the Court has used that term,77 the rationale be-
hind the commercial speech cases suggests that professional speech de-
serves significant first amendment protection.78 The Court's expansion
of first amendment protection to commercial speech has thus operated
to increase the tension between the Sherman Act and the first amend-
ment.
A. Commercial Speech and the First Amendment.
In 1942 the Supreme Court decided in Valentine v. Chrestensen79
that the first amendment did not protect commercial speech. In
Chrestensen the owner of a submarine distributed handbills in the New
York streets advertising the submarine and soliciting visitors. To cir-
cumvent a New York ordinance prohibiting the distribution of com-
mercial advertisements,80 he printed on the back of the handbill a
protest of the city's refusal to provide wharfing facilities. The police
prevented the submarine owner from distributing the handbill. In up-
holding New York's ordinance, the Court considered both the city's
right to regulate the use of its streets8' and the submarine owner's first
Arizona v. Maricopa County Medical Soe'y, [1980-1] TRADE CAS. (CCH) 63,239, at 78,155 (9th
Cir. 1980).
75. See Havighurst 359.
76. See generally Bayus, The Constitutional Status of Commercial Expression, 3 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 761 (1976); Meiklejobn, Commercial Speech and the First Amendment, 13 CALIF.
W.L. REv. 430 (1977); Rotunda, The Commerical Speech Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 1976 U.
ILL. L.F. 1080; Comment, Commercial Speech and the FirstAmendment: An Emerging Doctrine, 5
HOFSTRA L. REV. 655 (1977).
77. Commercial speech, roughly defined, is "speech of any form that advertises a product or
service for profit or for business purpose." J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, & J. YOUNG, HANDBOOK ON
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 767 (1978).
78. See notes 109-30 infra and accompanying text.
79. 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
80. Id. at 53. The ordinance stated in part: "No person shall throw, cast or distribute, or
cause or permit to be thrown, cast or distributed, any handbill, circular, card, booklet, placard or
other advertising matter whatsoever, in or upon any street or public place .... " Id. at 53 n.l.
81. The Court stated that although streets are proper places for the dissemination of public
information, a city may prevent "what it deems an undesirable invasion of, or interference with,
the full and free use of the highways by the people .... " Id. at 54-55.
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amendment rights.82 Finding, however, that the submarine owner's ac-
tual purpose was to advertise his submarine rather than to make a po-
litical protest about the unavailability of wharfing facilities, the Court
concluded that the owner was engaging in purely commerical speech. 83
The Constitution, the Court decided, imposes "no ... restraint on gov-
ernment as respects purely commercial advertising. '84 Given the own-
er's commercial purpose, the public's interest in receiving the
information was not an issue in the Court's determination. 85
It is not completely clear whether, under the commercial speech
doctrine of Chrestensen, physicians' professional speech would be ac-
corded first amendment protection. Because such speech involves pri-
marily professional or otherwise commercial matters, a Chrestensen-
type analysis might preclude first amendment protection. Whether
Chrestensen would in fact isolate professional speech from first amend-
ment protection, however, is of little significance today. Although
Chrestensen has not been explicitly overruled, later Court decisions
have seriously undermined the validity of its holding.8 6 Under these
later decisions, professional speech now should receive significant first
amendment protection.
Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, Inc. ,87 decided twenty-four years after Chrestensen, marks the
Court's most significant departure from the Chrestensen commercial
speech doctrine. Virginia State Board involved a Virginia statute that
prohibited pharmacists from publishing, advertising, or otherwise pro-
moting any price or credit terms of prescription drugs.88 The Court
82. Id.
83. Id. at 55.
84. Id. at 54.
85. Id. at 55. The lower court had recognized implicitly that isolating commercial speech
from first amendment guarantees would lead to the prohibition of important communication that
was of interest to the public, because of the difficulty of categorizing speech as "commercial."
Chrestensen v. Valentine, 122 F.2d 511, 515-16 (2d Cir. 1941), rev'd, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).
86. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980);
In re Primus, 436 U.S. 412 (1978); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Carey v. Population
Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977); Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1977);
Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976);
Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809 (1975); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964);
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105
(1943). But see Friedman v. Rogers, 440 U.S. 1 (1979).
87. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
88. The statute provided that a pharmacist licensed in Virginia was guilty of unprofessional
conduct if he advertised, "in any manner whatsoever, any amount, price, fee, premium, discount,
rebate or credit terms. . . for any drugs which may be dispensed only by prescription." Id. at
749-50.
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found that the intent of the pharmacists in promoting the drugs, like
that of the submarine owner in Chrestensen, was purely commercial:
Our pharmacist does not wish to editorialize on any subject, cultural,
philosophical, or political. He does not wish to report any particu-
larly newsworthy fact, or to make generalized observations even
about commercial matters. The "idea" he wishes to communicate is
simply this: "I will sell you the X prescription drug at the Y price." 89
Although under Chrestensen such a commercial intent would have
precluded first amendment protection,90 the Virginia State Board Court
held that "commerical speech, like other varieties, is protected" by the
first amendment.9 1 The Court held the Virginia statute unconstitu-
tional.92
What distinguishes the Court's analysis in Virginia State Board
from its analysis in Chrestensen is that the Chrestensen Court consid-
ered only the interest of the speaker in disseminating commercial infor-
mation. Because the first amendment was directed primarily to
noncommercial speech, the Court concluded that the speaker's com-
mercial intent could preclude first amendment protection. 93 In Virginia
State Board, however, the Court considered not only the "purely eco-
nomic" interest of the speaker, 94 but also the commercial and noncom-
mercial interests of the recipients and of society as a whole.95 The
Court noted that the recipients of the advertisements, whose welfare
depended on the procurement of prescription drugs, maintained an es-
pecially "keen" interest "in the free flow of commercial information. '96
Generalizing, the Court stated that "[e]ven an individual advertise-
ment, though entirely 'commercial,' may be of general public inter-
89. Id. at 761.
90. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
91. 425 U.S. at 770.
92. Id.
93. See notes 83-85 supra and accompanying text.
94. 425 U.S. at 762.
95. Id. at 763-65. The determination of the degree of first amendment protection that a spe-
cific type of speech receives is essentially a two-step process. First, the interests of the speaker, the
audience, and society must be weighed against the costs of permitting the speech in question to be
protected. Second, assuming the balancing test favors first amendment protection, the Court must
determine the permissible scope of regulation of the protected speech. This is the analysis the
Court employed in Virginia State Board, in which the Court assessed the interests of the adver-
tiser, id. at 762, the consumer, id. at 763-64, and society, id. at 764, and weighed these interests
against the justifications for the advertising ban, id. at 766-68.
The Court used an identical analysis in Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977), holding that
the Supreme Court of Arizona's restraint upon attorney advertising violated the first amendment.
Id. at 363-65, 368-79. After concluding that the justifications for the advertising ban did not
outweigh the interests in free speech, the Court, as it had in Virginia State Board, outlined some
permissible regulations. Id. at 383-84.
96. 425 U.S. at 763.
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est."' 97 The justification for the Virginia statute, "[a]rrayed against
these substantial individual and societal interests," could not withstand
first amendment scrutiny.98
Since Virginia State Board the Supreme Court has repeatedly reaf-
firmed that commerical speech is entitled to first amendment protec-
tion. In Linmark Associates v. Townshio of Willingboro99 the Court,
relying on Virginia State Board, held that the first amendment pro-
tected the display of home "for sale" and "sold" signs. °0 Similarly, in
Carey v. Population Services International,'10 the Court invalidated a
state law that prohibited anyone, including licensed pharmacists, from
advertising or displaying contraceptives. 0 2 In Bates v. State Bar'0 3 the
Court refused to allow a state supreme court to maintain rules prohibit-
ing attorneys from advertising. 04 And, more recently, in In re
Primus0 5 the Court overturned a state supreme court's holding that an
American Civil Liberties Union attorney had violated a state discipli-
nary rule "by attempting to solicit a client."' 0 6 These decisions indicate
that the "casual, almost offhand"' 07 holding of Chrestensen is no longer
authoritative. Commercial speech can no longer be regulated without
regard to the first amendment implications of the regulation. 08
B. Professional Speech and the First Amendment.
Professional speech deserves as much, or more, first amendment
protection than commerical speech. Professional speech embodies
more than the advertisement of goods and services; it involves the com-
munication, among professionals, of ethical, moral, and occupational
concerns.109 At the heart of professional speech is the communication
of value judgments about the status and future of the profession. The
concerns frequently raised in professional speech certainly lie closer to
the core of first amendment protection than the purely commercial con-
97. Id. at 764.
98. Id. at 766.
99. 431 U.S. 85 (1977).
100. Id. at 97.
101. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
102. Id. at 700.
103. 433 U.S. 350 (1977). See note 95 supra and accompanying text.
104. 433 U.S. at 382.
105. 436 U.S. 412 (1978).
106. Id. at 420.
107. Cammarano v. United States, 358 U.S. 498, 514 (1959) (Douglas, J., concurring).
108. See also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 100 S. Ct. 2814, 2830 (1980) (Stevens,
J., concurring) ("the Court has accorded virtually absolute protection to the dissemination of in-
formation or ideas").
109. See text accompanying notes 39-44 supra.
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cerns raised in the commercial speech cases. 0 Indeed, permitting pro-
fessional speech a higher level of protection than pure commercial
speech is consistent with the Court's traditional protection of the right
to disseminate and receive information pertinent to moral and ideologi-
cal considerations."' 1 Moreover, professional speech should not lose
first amendment protection merely because economic considerations
motivate it. The Supreme Court has held that such motives are not
sufficient to remove otherwise ideological speech from the parameters
of first amendment protection.' 12
A separate assessment of the interests affected by professional
speech also suggests that it deserves significant first amendment protec-
tion. Virginia State Board and subsequent cases have identified three
such interests: the speaker's interest in disseminating information, the
listener's interest in receiving information, and the interest of society in
free communication among individuals. 1 3 Because professional
speech deals with both the occupational and ideological concerns of the
medical profession, physicians, who constitute both the disseminators
and the recipients of professional speech, have a strong interest in its
free exchange. Similarly, society benefits from the free exchange of
ideas and health care innovations that contribute to the development of
the health care industry. The protection of professional speech thus
ensures uninhibited contributions to the "market place of ideas."" 4
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has indicated that it initially de-
termines whether a form of speech is entitled to first amendment pro-
tection by balancing the first amendment rights of those affected by the
speech against the disadvantages of extending first amendment guaran-
tees." 5  The interests of the speaker, the listener, and society must
therefore be weighed against the costs of protecting professional
110. Though commercial speech may concern items of general public concern, see, e.g., Bige-
low v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822 (1975), its primary characteristic is that it is motivated by a
desire to advertise some product or service in order to reap a profit.
111. Justice Stewart emphasized in Virginia State Board the distinction between ideological
speech and mere commercial speech. He suggested that ideological speech is entitled to a higher
degree of first amendment protection because, unlike commercial speech, it is "integrally related
to the exposition of thought--thought that may shape our concepts of the whole universe of man."
425 U.S. at 779 (Stewart, J., concurring).
112. See Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501-02 (1952) ("That books, newspa-
pers, and magazines are published and sold for profit does not prevent them from being a form of
expression whose liberty is safeguarded by the First Amendment"). See also Smith v. California,
361 U.S. 147, 150 (1959); Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943).
113. 425 U.S. at 762-65; see Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-65 (1977). See also Linmark
Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85,96 (1977); Bigelow v. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 822
(1975).
114. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2326, 2333 (1980).
115. See notes 94-98 supra and accompanying text.
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speech. There is, of course, a significant disadvantage, not relevant in
the commercial speech cases, to extending first amendment protection
to professional speech: the danger of permitting physicians to engage
in uninhibited anticompetitive communication. 16 Under the rule of
reason, the Sherman Act prohibits communication that is likely to have
an anticompetitive effect. 117 Extending first amendment protection to
professional speech would necessarily limit traditional Sherman Act
prohibitions, and permit physicians, either intentionally or unintention-
ally, to engage in anticompetitive activity.118
The dilemma presented by this conflict between the Sherman Act
and the first amendment is aggravated by the Court's persistent refusal
to permit speech restrictions based on the speech's "primary effect"-
the effect of the speech when those who receive the information act
upon it."l9 Under the Sherman Act's rule of reason, courts prohibiting
commercial data dissemination do so because of its effect when com-
petitors receiving the information act upon it.t20 In determining
whether professional speech deserves first amendment protection, the
possibility that the communication violates the rule of reason may
therefore be an improper consideration. Arguably, the government's
reasons for prohibiting anticompetitive data dissemination should out-
weigh the first amendment concerns involved. Nevertheless, the
Supreme Court has refused to permit speech's primary effect to
preclude first amendment protection even when faced with important
state objectives.
For example, in Linmark Associates v. Townshiv of Willingboro12 1
a township passed an ordinance prohibiting the posting of "for sale"
and "sold" signs that was intended to discourage panic selling by white
homeowners who feared an influx of blacks into the township. The
Court held the ordinance unconstitutional, stating, "Willingboro has
proscribed particular types of signs based on their content because it
fears their 'primary' effect-that they will cause those receiving the in-
formation to act upon it.' u 22 That the township enacted the ordinance
to achieve the important objective of promoting stable, racially inte-
116. Because commercial speech promotes rather than inhibits competition, the protection of
commercial speech does not present this problem.
117. See note 18 supra.
118. See notes 39-44 supra and accompanying text.
119. See Linmark Assocs. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85 (1979).
120. See note 18 supra and accompanying text.
121. 431 U.S. 85 (1977). See generally Note, Commercial Speech, Blockbusting, and the First
Amendmen. Linmark Associates, Inc. v. Township of Wilingboro, 7 CAP. L. REV. 271 (1977); 23
Lo'y. L. REv. 1038 (1977); 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 883 (1977).
122. 431 U.S. at 94.
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grated housing was not decisive.' 23 "[T]he First Amendment disabled
the State from achieving its goal by restricting the free flow of truthful
information."'124
Virginia State Board 25 is another example of the Court's refusing
to permit speech restrictions based on the speech's primary effect. In
holding that the first amendment protects prescription drug advertising,
the Court reviewed the arguments of pharmacists that such advertising
could unfavorably influence professional standards. 26 As in Linmark
Associates, however, the Court recognized that the alleged influence on
professional standards was not the direct result of the advertising;
rather, the pharmacists feared that professional standards would be
hurt because those receiving the information would act upon it.127 In
essence, then, the pharmacists wanted to prohibit drug advertising be-
cause they feared the advertising's primary effect. 128 Prohibiting
speech because of anticipated reactions to it is, the Court held, not per-
missible: "It is precisely this kind of choice, between the dangers of
suppressing information, and the dangers of its misuse if it is freely
available, that the First Amendment makes for us."'1 29
The rule of reason, which defines Sherman Act prohibitions ac-
cording to the effect of allegedly anticompetitive activity, thus runs into
direct conflict with the mandates of Linmark Associates and Virginia
State Board. Although distinctions can certainly be drawn between
commercial speech and professional speech, the fundamental principle
of these commercial speech cases is applicable to both: the state may
not control the lawful conduct of its citizens by keeping them in igno-
rance.' 30 In a balancing of first amendment guarantees against anti-
123. Id. at 94-95. Although the Court emphasized that it "recognized that substantial benefits
flow to both whites and blacks from interracial association," id., the strong state interest could not
preclude first amendment protection. Id. at 95.
124. Id. at 95.
125. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748 (1976). See notes 87-92 supra.
126. 425 U.S. at 766-70. The pharmacists argued that the aggressive price competition that
would result from unlimited drug advertising would force pharmacists to cut costs by reducing
professional standards and services. Id. at 767-68.
127. Id. at 769.
128. The Court stated: "The advertising ban does not directly affect professional standards
one way or the other. It affects them only through the reactions it is assumed people will have to
the free flow of drug information." Id.
129. Id. at 770.
130. Despite the Supreme Court's unequivocal tone in Virginia State Board and Linmark As-
sociates, a recent decision intimates that in narrow cases a state may restrain speech because of its
primary effect. In Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343
(1980), the Court invalidated a state's restraint on advertising that promoted the use of electricity.
Id. at 2353-54. Significantly, however, the Court intimated that under narrow circumstances such
a restraint might be permissible, given the important state goal of conserving energy. Id. at 2353;
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trust prohibitions, the balance therefore shifts substantially in favor of
first amendment protection. Prohibiting speech, even to serve an im-
portant state objective such as preserving competition, cannot with-
stand first amendment scrutiny when the prohibition is intended to
prevent the speech's primary effect. Professional speech, even though
potentially anticompetitive, should therefore be protected by the first
amendment.
IV. THE RECONCILIATION OF SHERMAN ACT PROHIBITIONS AND
FIRST AMENDMENT GUARANTEES
That professional speech is entitled to significant first amendment
protection does not mean, however, that the state can never restrict it.
The Supreme Court has consistently indicated, in cases extending first
amendment protection to new forms of speech, that protection does not
suggest that the speech "may never be regulated in any way."' 3t To be
valid, the regulations must be reasonable and closely tied to the harm
they are designed to prevent, with minimal intrusion on free speech
guarantees. 132
A. The Traditional Reconciliation of the Sherman Act and the First
Amendment- The Noerr-Pennington Doctrine.
The Supreme Court has faced the task of reconciling Sherman Act
prohibitions and first amendment guarantees in another context. To
protect the first amendment right to petition, the Court developed the
Noerr-Pennington doctrine 133 for those instances in which the exercise
of that right constitutes anticompetitive activity that, in the absence of
see id. at 2355 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun vehemently
argued that permitting such a restraint would depart from the rule of Virginia State Board and
Linmark Associates that "the State 'may not [pursue its goals] by keeping the public in igno-
rance.'" .d. at 2356 (quoting Virginia State Board, 425 U.S. at 770) (emphasis added by Justice
Blackmun). Even if the case should signal a departure from Virginia Slate Board and Linmark
Associates, it is doubtful that the Court would extend this departure to forms of speech other than
the narrow "promotional" advertising, i e., advertising merely intended to stimulate consumption,
see 100 S. Ct. at 2347 (majority opinion), involved in that case. See id. at 2350 ("The First
Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational function of advertis-
ing").
131. Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
132. See Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350-51
(1980). See also L. TIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 576-84 (1978).
133. See generally Fischel, Antitrust Liabilityfor Attempts to Influence Government Action: The
Basis and Limits of the Noerr-Pennington Doctrine, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 80 (1977); Holzer, An
Analysisfor Reconciling theAntitrust Laws with the Right to Petition: Noerr-Pennington in Light of
Cantor v. Detroit Edison, 27 EMORY L.J. 673, 678-83 (1978). See also Havighurst 360; Note,
Physician Influence: Applying Noerr-Pennington to the Medical Profession, 1978 DUKE L.J. 701,
701-05.
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constitutional protection, would violate the Sherman Act. The Noerr-
Pennington doctrine thus is a logical starting place in the search for a
regulatory scheme to reconcile the Sherman Act and the freedom of
speech.134 An examination of the doctrine reveals, however, that al-
though it helps reconcile conflicts between the Sherman Act and the
first amendment right to petition, it is not helpful in reconciling con-
flicts between the Sherman Act and the freedom of speech.
The first case to pose the Sherman Act against the first amendment
right to petition, Eastern Railroad Presidents Conference v. Noerr Motor
Freight, Inc.,135 involved a competitive battle between the railroads
and the trucking industry for long-distance freight hauling. The rail-
roads had hired a public relations firm to conduct a publicity campaign
against the truckers, designed, the Court stated, to "foster the adoption
and retention of laws. . . destructive of the trucking business," and to
"create an atmosphere of distaste for the truckers among the general
public."' 36 The truckers' complaint alleged that the railroads, in their
attempt to influence the legislature by means of a publicity campaign,
had violated the Sherman Act. 137
Writing for the Court, Justice Black admitted that the railroads'
intent had been to discourage competition. 38 Even though such a pur-
pose would have been sufficient to make the activity unlawful under
the rule of reason, 39 the Court held that the railroads' actions escaped
Sherman Act liability because "mere attempts to influence the passage
or enforcement of laws" could not constitute a violation of the Act.140
Construing the Act to forbid the railroads' actions, the Court explained,
would raise "important constitutional questions" because the Act, by
inhibiting the right of the people to inform the government of their
wishes, would regulate not only "business activity" but "political activ-
ity" as well. 141 Such a legislative intent, the Court held, cannot be in-
134. See Havighurst 355-60.
135. 365 U.S. 127 (1961).
136. Id. at 129.
137. Id. at 130-3 1. The complaint described the railroads' campaign as "vicious, corrupt, and
fraudulent," first because "the sole motivation behind it was the desire on the part of the railroads
to injure the truckers and eventually to destroy them as competitors," and second because the
railroads had used "the so-called third party technique, that is, the publicity matter was made to
appear as spontaneously expressed views of independent persons and civic groups when, in fact, it
was. . . paid for by the railroads." Id. at 129-30.
138. Id. at 138.
139. Under the rule of reason either an anticompetitive purpose or an anticompetitive effect
violates the Sherman Act. See note 18 supra.
140. 365 U.S. at 135.
141. Id. at 137-38.
1163Vol. 1980:1142]
DUKE LAW JOURNAL
ferred from the Sherman Act.142
The Court reiterated the holding of Noerr in UnitedMine Workers
v. Pennington,43 the second case to match the first amendment against
the Sherman Act. In Pennington the United Mine Workers and several
large coal companies agreed to urge the Secretary of Labor to enact
regulations concerning purchases in the coal spot market and wages.
The Court found that the purpose of the agreement was to gain control
of the coal market by driving small companies out of business.'4 As in
Noerr, such a purpose under a traditional rule-of-reason analysis
would have led the Court to hold the agreement unlawful.145 But, as in
Noerr, instead of holding the agreement unlawful the Court held that
the right to petition 46 "shields from the Sherman Act a concerted effort
to influence public officials regardless of intent or purpose."' 147 Under
Noerr and Pennington the Court would not construe the Sherman Act
to violate first amendment guarantees.
The Noerr-Pennington solution for reconciling first amendment
guarantees with Sherman Act prohibitions is at best a solution of lim-
ited applicability. The Noerr-Pennington doctrine assumes that speech
can be classified as either political or business-related. 4 The Sherman
Act regulates business activity, the Noerr Court presumed, and the first
amendment protects political activity. 49 Because the right to petition
constitutes "not business activity, but political activity,"' 0 it falls under
the protection of the first amendment and does not trigger the Sherman
Act.
This analysis is consistent with the Court's antitrust treatment of
commercial data dissemination in earlier cases. As business activity,
the data dissemination apparently fell under the prohibitions of the
142. Id. The Court was adamant in its refusal to permit the Sherman Act to inhibit the exer-
cise of political freedoms. The Court stated that "the whole concept of representation depends
upon the ability of people to make their wishes known to their representatives." Id. at 137. A
finding that the Sherman Act could prevent individuals from freely informing the government
thus would impute to the Act "a purpose which would have no basis whatever in the legislative
history of the Act." Id.
143. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
144. Id. at 660.
145. See note 18 supra.
146. Although Pennington failed to mention the right to petition explicitly, its reliance on No.
err indicated that "the rationale for exempting attempts to induce govermental action from the
antitrust laws was closely related to important first amendment policies." Holzer, supra note 133,
at 680.
147. 381 U.S. at 670.
148. Eastern R.R. President's Conference v. Noerr, 365 U.S. at 137.
149. Id. at 138.
150. Id. at 137.
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Sherman Act without triggering first amendment protections. 15' The
Noerr-Pennington doctrine's reliance on the distinction between busi-
ness and political speech, however, renders the doctrine ineffective for
resolving the modem conflict between the Sherman Act and the first
amendment. The erosion of the Chrestensen commercial speech doc-
trine has made it infeasible to categorize speech as either business or
political for the purpose of determining the applicability of first amend-
ment guarantees.' 5 2
B. Other Traditional Regulatory Schemes.
The Supreme Court in the past decade has outlined a variety of
other permissible schemes besides Noerr-Pennington to regulate the
freedom of speech. Commercial speech that is "false, deceptive, or
misleading" is subject to special restrictions. 53 This regulation does
not apply to professional speech, however, which is most frequently
concerned with ideas, because "there is no such thing as a false
idea." '154 Nor can regulations of data dissemination be characterized as
"time, place, or manner" restrictions. 55 The goal of antidissemination
regulations is not to restrict a troublesome means of communication,
but to prevent the intraprofessional communication because of its con-
tent. 5 6 The other regulations the Court frequently employs are simi-
larly unhelpful: professional speech does not concern transactions that
"are themselves illegal,"' 157 need not employ the electronic broadcast
151. See notes 15-38 supra and accompanying text.
152. See notes 86-98 supra and accompanying text.
153. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977).
154. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 780 (1976) (Stewart, J., concurring) (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339
(1974)).
155. See Martin v. Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).
156. See, e.g., National Soc'y of Professional Eng'rs v. United States, 435 U.S. 679 (1978).
157. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 772 (citing Pittsburgh Press Co. v. Pittsburgh Comm'n on Human Relations, 413 U.S. 376
(1973)). In Pittsburgh Press the Supreme Court upheld against a first amendment challenge an
ordinance that prohibited newspapers from carrying "help wanted" advertisements in sex-desig-
nated columns. Noting the illegality of sex discrimination, the Court analogized the sex-desig-
nated advertisements to advertisements "proposing a sale of narcotics or soliciting prostitutes."
Id. at 388. The first amendment, the Court concluded, did not prevent the government from
prohibiting speech that proposed such illegal transactions. Id.
The regulation delineated in Pittsburgh Press, however, is inapplicable to the Sherman Act
prohibition of data dissemination. The dissemination of commercial or ethical information does
not propose transactions that are necessarily illegal; nor can the disseminated information, as in
Pittsburgh Press, be used only to accomplish illegal ends. Instead, the dissemination of commer-
cial or ethical information simply constitutes speech that can, in particular circumstances, be put
to illegal use. If the first amendment left unprotected all speech that could possibly be used ille-
gally, it would protect very little.
1165Vol. 1980:1142]
DUKE LAW JO UWiVAL
media, 5 8 and is not obscene.' 59
The "clear and present danger" test of Brandenburg v. Ohio 160 may
seem to be a useful means of regulating professional speech. Under
that test the state may prohibit speech that is "directed to inciting or
producing imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such ac-
tion." 61 Because both the Brandenburg test and the rule of reason con-
sider the purpose and the effect of the speech, 162 the Brandenburg test
seems to be an attractive complement to the rule of reason. Unfortu-
nately, however, using the Brandenburg test in the antitrust context
would cause a serious problem. Under the rule of reason, an unlawful
intent, even in the absence of an actual showing of anticompetitive ef-
fect, is sufficient to find an activity unlawful. 163 By requiring that the
first amendment protect anticompetitive speech unless the speech is
"likely to produce" an anticompetitive effect, the Brandenburg test, un-
like the rule of reason, would require an examination of the anticipated
effect of the allegedly anticompetitive speech in every case. Such a re-
quirement would be unfortunate, because determining anticompetitive
effect in antitrust suits can be a lengthy, detailed, and expensive under-
taking. l6 Anticipating anticompetitive effect would be equally diffi-
cult. Subjecting courts to this burdensome analysis would significantly
lengthen antitrust litigation and compromise the effectiveness of the
Sherman Act. 165
158. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
159. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
160. 395 U.S. 444 (1969). Brandenburg reversed on first amendment grounds the conviction of
a Ku Klux Klan leader who had been charged with advocating political reform through violence.
161. 395 U.S. at 447. The Brandenburg test was discussed in the commercial speech context in
Carey v. Population Servs. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977). Carey involved the applicability of first
amendment guarantees to a New York statute that prohibited the advertising or display of contra-
ceptives. In defense of the statute, the state argued that the advertisements would be "offensive
and embarrassing" and would "legitimize sexual activity of young people." Id. at 701. The Court
rejected these assertions. The possibility that speech can be offensive is not a sufficient justifica-
tion for suppressing that speech; nor does the remote possibility of illicit sexual behavior justify
constraints on advertising contraceptives. Citing Brandenburg, the Court stated that in the ab-
sence of obscenity the only permissible test was whether the advertisements were "directed to
inciting imminent lawless action and... likely to incite or produce such action." Id.
162. See note 18 supra.
163. See note 18 supra.
164. See J. VoN KALINOWSKI, supra note 45, § 6.02[4].
165. In light of the difficulty of conclusively determining anticompetitive effect in antitrust
cases, courts applying the Brandenburg test to professional speech might well slip into the habit of
merely inferring anticompetitive effect from the manner and content of the physicians' data dis-
semination. See United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333 (1969). See also notes
27-35 supra and accompanying text. Such a test would amount to little more than applying a per
se rule to professional speech, and would compromise to an unfortunate degree the ability of
physicians to communicate.
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The traditional regulatory schemes employed by the Supreme
Court are therefore unhelpful in devising a regulatory scheme to recon-
cile the conflict between the Sherman Act and the first amendment.
The Supreme Court, however, has faced opposition between economic
regulation and the first amendment in another context: labor picketing.
Although picketing is regarded as "speech plus"' 166 and is therefore tra-
ditionally accorded only limited first amendment protection, 67 a re-
view of the Court's decisions involving the conflict between the right to
picket and state law suggests a regulatory scheme that is uniquely
suited for regulating anticompetitive data dissemination.' 68
C. Labor Picketing and the First Amendment.
In both the labor-picketing and data-dissemination situations, the
desire to protect the free exchange of facts and ideas through intellec-
tual persuasion conflicts with the desire to leave economically disrup-
tive or otherwise undesirable behavior unprotected. The Court's labor
picketing cases have largely fallen into disuse with the federal preemp-
tion of the labor law field;169 the picketing cases are nonetheless useful
in the first amendment-Sherman Act conflict. A careful review of the
Court's picketing decisions not only highlights the difficulties in recon-
ciling economic regulation with first amendment guarantees, but also
suggests a scheme for reconciling the opposing policies embodied in
each.
In Thornhill v. Alabama 70 the Supreme Court established that la-
bor picketing is entitled to first amendment protection. A picketing la-
borer was arrested for violating an Alabama statute that prohibited any
person from loitering near a business to deter other persons from deal-
ing with it. The Court carefully noted that the laborer's protest had
been peaceful, and that his purpose had been to advise customers of the
business's poor labor practices. "The freedom of speech," the Court
stated, "embraces at least the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully
all matters of public concern .... ,"171 Though a more narrowly writ-
166. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. at 455 (Douglas, J., concurring).
167. See L. TRIBE, supra note 132, at 598-99.
168. See Purdue, supra note 39, at 5.
169. See Comment, Political Boycott Activity and the First Amendment, 91 HARV. L. REv. 659,
663 (1978). For a discussion of federal preemption of the labor law area, see Cox, Federalism in
the Law ofLabor Relations, 67 HARv. L. REv. 1297 (1954).
170. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
171. Id. at 101. By highlighting the role of public concern, the Thornhill Court emphasized a
consideration that was ignored less than two years later in Chrevtensen, and that eventually led to
the decline of the Chrestensen commercial speech doctrine. See notes 86-98 supra and accompa-
nying text.
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ten regulation of labor picketing might have been permissible, 172 a
blanket prohibition was not. The Court held the Alabama statute un-
constitutional on its face.173
Despite the breadth of the Thornhill holding, the Court later sig-
nificantly restricted the right to picket. The case most clearly marking
the Court's retreat, Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice CO.,174 involved
picketing by union members of a company that transacted business
with nonunion workers. 175 The sole purpose of the picketing was to
force the nonunion workers to join the union. 176 The trial and appel-
late courts had enjoined the union's picketing under a local trade stat-
ute; the Supreme Court affirmed. In contrast to its holding in
Thornhill, the Giboney Court suggested that the state's power to regu-
late trade should be paramount, and that nothing in the first amend-
ment suggests otherwise.' 77 The Court vaguely distinguished Thornhill
as being directed against sweeping state prohibitions and therefore in-
applicable to the facts of Giboney.I78
The holding in Giboney is difficult to harmonize with the Thornhill
mandate that states "dealing with the evils arising from industrial dis-
putes. .. [may not] impair the effective exercise of the right to discuss
freely industrial relations. . . . ',179 Less than two years after Giboney,
however, Archibald Cox recommended a means for reconciling Thorn-
hill and Giboney.180 Cox asserted that the cases involved two different
forms of picketing. In Giboney the picketing had been directed not to-
ward gaining the sympathy of disinterested third parties, but toward
172. 310 U.S. at 104-05.
173. Id.
174. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
175. In Giboney members of the Ice and Coal Drivers Union in Kansas City attempted to
induce nonmember drivers to join the union. When most of the nonunion drivers refused, the
union members set out to obtain agreements from the city wholesale ice distributors that they
would not sell ice to nonunion drivers. Agreements were obtained from every distributor except
Empire Storage and Ice. After warning Empire, the union picketed its place of business. Id. at
492.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 504. The Court's language was unequivocal: "We hold that the state's power to
govern in this field is paramount, and that nothing in the Constitutional guarant[e]es of speech or
press compels a state to apply or not to apply its antitrade restraint law to groups of workers,
businesses, or others." Id.
178. Id. at 499-500:
[Thornhil] was directed toward a sweeping state prohibition which this Court found to
embrace "nearly every practicable, effective means whereby those interested-including
the employees directly affected-may enlighten the public on the nature and causes of a
labor dispute." . . . mhe general statement of the limitation of a state's power to im-
pair free speech was not intended to apply to the fact situation presented here ....
(quoting Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940)).
179. 310 U.S. at 104.
180. Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VAND. L. Rav. 574 (1951).
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coercing competing workers into a certain type of desirable conduct.
Cox termed this "signal" picketing because of its signal to nonunion
members that they should join the union.181 In Thornhill, on the other
hand, the picketing had been intended to educate and persuade disin-
terested third parties in hopes of soliciting their willing sympathy and
support. Cox terms this activity "publicity" picketing. 182 The two
types of picketing are subtly distinguishable. Publicity picketing in-
volves the dissemination of information in the hope of obtaining will-
ing support through intellectual persuasion; signal picketing does not
involve information dissemination with an eye toward persuasion, but
merely operates to coerce or coordinate a desired response.
The Supreme Court did not explicitly adopt Cox's distinction be-
tween publicity and signal speech in later cases dealing with state
prohibitions of picketing. Professor Cox's distinction is nevertheless
consistent with the Court's analysis in these cases, which recognizes
that speech intended only to convey information should be accorded
greater first amendment protection than speech intended to do other
than convey information. 183 Although Cox's test may no longer be use-
ful for reconciling the tension between the right to picket and state law,
it is useful for reconciling the modem tension between the first amend-
ment and the Sherman Act in the context of physicians' professional
speech. Under the Cox test, the first amendment would not protect
physicians' dissemination of anticompetitive speech that was intended
not to convey information, but to signal the desirability of some an-
ticompetitive objective. The Sherman Act thus could constitutionally
prohibit the dissemination. Where physicians genuinely intend to dis-
seminate information or ideas, however, the first amendment would
protect the professional data dissemination. Under the Cox test, for
example, the circulation of an advisory fee schedule, presumably an
effort to coordinate anticompetitive activity, would be prohibited under
181. Id. 593-95.
182. Id.
183. See International Bhd. of Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957). In
Vogt the Court upheld an injunction prohibiting laborers from picketing a business when their
intent was to coerce the owner into pressuring his employees to join the union. Id. at 285. Al-
though the Court did not explicitly rely on Cox's distinction between publicity and signal speech,
it did admit that picketing is generally susceptible to regulation because it "involvels] more than
just communication of ideas. ... Id. at 289. Further emphasizing the distinction between
speech merely involving communication and speech involving "more than 'publicity,"' id. at 290,
the Court recalled that the picketers in Giboney had been "do'.ng more than exercising a right of
free speech or press." They had exercised "their economic power together with that of their allies
to compel Empire to abide by union rather than by state regulation of trade." Id. at 292 (quoting
Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490, 509 (1949)). See also National Labor Rela-
tions Act, 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7) (1976).
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the Sherman Act's data dissemination prohibition. Such speech, con-
tributing little or nothing to the marketplace of ideas, would be a
classic case of signal speech. In contrast, an intraprofessional commu-
nication earnestly asserting that a certain health financing mechanism
disrupts the doctor-patient relationship would enjoy first amendment
protection as publicity speech-assuming that it was intended to per-
suade fellow physicians, rather than to signal a boycott. This does not
mean, of course, that publicity speech may never be prohibited under
the Sherman Act. Presumably, upon determining that a particular
communication constitutes publicity rather than signal speech, a court
would then balance the physicians' first amendment interest in its dis-
semination against the significance of the threatened anticompetitive
harm to determine whether or not to prohibit the dissemination. In this
way, the courts would accord maximum protection both to competition
in the health care industry and to competition in the physicians' mar-
ketplace of ideas.184
Applying the-Cox test to anticompetitive data dissemination re-
sults in a practical and intellectually satisfactory means of reconciling
the tension between the first amendment and the Sherman Act. The
test is practical because, unlike the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, it does
not rely on the problematic distinction between political activity and
business activity.8 5 Moreover, in contrast to the clear-and-present-
danger test of Brandenburg,8 6 the Cox test does not require a finding of
anticompetitive effect before the speech can be prohibited. The Cox
test thus moves in comfortable conformity with the rule of reason,
which does not require an actual showing of anticompetitive effect once
an anticompetitive intent has been established. 87
The Cox test is intellectually satisfactory because it does not re-
strict or inhibit legitimate attempts to disseminate information. If the
speaker's intent is to persuade, then significant first amendment protec-
tion applies to the data dissemination. Only where the speaker intends
to coerce or otherwise signal anticompetitive activity does first amend-
ment protection not apply. Intuitively, a speaker's dissemination of
data that is not intended to persuade intellectually, but rather is in-
tended to coordinate illegal activity, should not receive first amend-
184. This analysis is consistent with the Supreme Court's recent decision in Central Hudson
Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343 (1980), see note 130 supra, which
intimated that "promotional" advertising-advertising intended only to promote consumption-
may be more subject to regulation than "informational" advertising-advertising intended to con-
vey information beyond what is directly related to sales. See id at 2347-48.
185. See text accompanying notes 148-52 supra.
186. See notes 160-65 supra and accompanying text.
187. See note 18 supra.
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ment protection: such speech contributes nothing to the marketplace of
ideas. 88 The Cox test, unlike the more traditional regulations of
speech, thus offers an attractive means for reconciling the tension be-
tween the Sherman Act and the first amendment.
V. CONCLUSION
The recent demise of the learned professions exemption suggests
that intraprofessional communication by physicians will now be subject
to the Sherman Act's prohibition of anticompetitive data dissemina-
tion. The Supreme Court's extension of first amendment guarantees to
commercial speech, however, indicates that such data dissemination
should be protected by the first amendment. The resulting tension may
be resolved by distinguishing between signal speech, intended to signal
or coordinate anticompetitive activity, and publicity speech, intended
to persuade. Protecting publicity speech under the first amendment,
and prohibiting signal speech under the Sherman Act, would preserve
earnest contributions to the marketplace of ideas while disallowing
manifestly anticompetitive schemes.
Although the conflict between the Sherman Act and the first
amendment arises most conspicuously in the traditionally anticompeti-
tive medical profession, an identical dilemma exists in other profes-
sions. With the demise of the learned professions exemption,
engineers, architects, pharmacists, and other professionals have been
exposed to more strict Sherman Act review; their intraprofessional data
dissemination nonetheless deserves first amendment protection. The
Cox test, then, has applicability beyond data dissemination by physi-
cians and is an attractive means for reconciling the conflict between the
Sherman Act and the freedom of speech in these other professions. De-
spite the broad applicability of the Cox test, however, the test would
not involve a significant departure from the traditional data dissemina-
tion prohibitions exemplified by American Column & Lumber. The reg-
ular exchange of price and production information, contributing little
to the marketplace of ideas, would almost always constitute signal
speech, deserving no first amendment protection. Even a broad appli-
cation of the Cox test would leave intact the Sherman Act's ability to
disallow typical forms of anticompetitive data dissemination.
Michael A Young
188. Cf. Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 100 S. Ct. 2343, 2350
(1980) ("The First Amendment's concern for commercial speech is based on the informational
function of advertising" rather than on its promotional function).
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